Support for President Donald Trump among non-college voters — a group that has formed the backbone of his political success — is showing signs of serious erosion. According to recent analysis cited by CNN, this shift is not marginal. It is dramatic, and it carries major implications for the Republican coalition heading into the 2026 midterm elections.

In 2024, Trump held a 14-point advantage over Vice President Kamala Harris among non-college voters. Today, that advantage has flipped. Trump is now trailing by nine points within the same demographic — a staggering 23-point swing away from Trump and the Republican Party. For a voter bloc that helped put Trump in the White House in 2016 and sustained him through 2020 and 2024, the change represents a flashing warning light for Republicans.

To put the shift in historical context, Larry Sabato, founder and director of the Center for Politics at the University of Virginia, argues that this moment should be viewed as part of a much longer arc in American politics. The realignment of working-class voters did not begin with Trump. It stretches back decades.

Sabato traces the roots of this transformation to the 1960s and 1970s, when social and cultural issues began pulling working-class Americans — particularly white, non-college voters — away from the Democratic Party. Once a voter group breaks from a party, Sabato explains, it becomes easier for that group to do so again. Over time, what begins as an exception becomes a habit, and eventually a new political identity forms.

This pattern is most visible among white, non-college voters, especially men. They have become far more likely to vote Republican and to support Trump than their female counterparts within the same educational group. That demographic reality formed the core of Republican victories in the 1990s, Trump’s surprise win in 2016, and his continued strength in subsequent elections.

That is precisely why the current movement away from Trump is so consequential. When a party begins losing support from the very voters who define its base, the impact can ripple through congressional races nationwide.

Sabato notes that cultural and social issues initially drove the realignment, but economic forces have reinforced it. Manufacturing jobs have disappeared in many regions that blue-collar workers depend on. Economic anxiety remains a powerful motivator, but it does not operate in isolation. Cultural identity, values, and perceptions of social change play a central role in shaping how voters respond to economic stress.

Historically, midterm elections amplify these dynamics. Without a presidential race at the top of the ticket, turnout often drops — particularly among conflicted or disengaged voters. If white, non-college voters become disillusioned enough to stay home rather than vote Republican, Democrats stand to gain significantly. Even a near split among these voters could deliver Democrats a substantial House majority.

The implications extend beyond 2026. Sabato suggests that Trump may be a singular political figure whose coalition does not easily transfer to a successor. Republican leaders, including Vice President J.D. Vance and others, appear to be quietly positioning themselves for a post-Trump future, testing how much of Trump’s base they can retain and how much the party’s coalition may need to evolve by 2028.

Ultimately, one number may determine everything: Trump’s approval rating. Traditionally, a president needs an approval rating close to or above 50 percent to successfully pass power to a chosen successor within the same party. Trump has never operated within that norm, but the math remains unforgiving.

Current polling places Trump’s approval in the mid-to-upper 30s. If that figure holds, Sabato argues, there is virtually no path for a Republican successor to win the presidency. A deeply unpopular outgoing president becomes a liability rather than an asset — not only for presidential candidates, but for congressional Republicans as well.

That reality explains why Republicans face such a precarious outlook heading into November. The erosion of Trump’s working-class support is not just a polling anomaly. It is a potential inflection point that could reshape the Republican coalition — and American politics — in the years ahead.